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Abstract:  When European nations colonized North America, their dealings with one another 
were based on the state model of territorial sovereignty.  At the same time, they acknowledged 
the independence of the Indigenous nations and entered into nation-to-nation treaties with them, 
whereby sovereignty was to be shared.  Consequently, the Westphalian concept of absolute state 
sovereignty has never applied in North America.  While the European nations acquired 
sovereignty vis-à-vis one another in the international law system that they created, the 
Indigenous nations retained internal sovereignty and the right to continue governing themselves.  
This modified concept of state sovereignty has been acknowledged by the United States Supreme 
Court since the 1820s and is gradually being accepted in Canada.  It is consistent with, and even 
required by, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in particular 
that document’s affirmation of the right of Indigenous peoples to self-determination and their 
right to internal self-government. 
Text 
The concept of sovereignty as we know it developed in Europe in the medieval period as the 
universalist claims to political authority of the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor were 
challenged by the rulers of emerging nation-states and as the fragmented jurisdiction that 
characterized feudalism was replaced by more centralized authority.1  This new system of 
independent states that had been developing since at least the 12th century was formally 
acknowledged by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.2  As theorized by Jean Bodin in Six Bookes of 
a Commonweale,3 published in 1576, sovereigns came to be viewed as having complete political 
authority within their territories and as being equal in their relations with one another.  This 
absolutist conception of sovereignty held sway up until the late twentieth century, when it began 
to be weakened by, among other things, creation of the European Union and acceptance of the 
Responsibility to Protect, whereby states have an obligation to intervene in the internal affairs of 
other states that engage in genocide and other crimes against humanity.4 
 
* I am grateful to Kathy Simo and Brian Slattery for reading and providing helpful feedback on a draft of this paper. 
1 See Sidney Painter, The Rise of the Feudal Monarchies (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951); Hendrik Spruyt, 
The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1994); Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 59-
125; Stuart Elden, The Birth of Territory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013). 
2 See Leo Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948” (1948) 42 Am. J. of Int’l L. 20; Benno Teschke, The Myth 
of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations (London: Verso, 2003); Stéphane 
Beaulac, The Power of Language in the Making of International Law: The Word Sovereignty in Bodin and Vattel 
and the Myth of Westphalia (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004). 
3 Jean Bodin, Les six livres de la république, Richard Knolles trans., Kenneth Douglas McRae ed. (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press 1962). 
4 The international community adopted the Responsibility to Protect at the 2005 World Summit of the United 
Nations. See United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, online: 
<https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml>. Of course, globalization and 
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 Prior to European colonization, the Indigenous nations of North America were factually 
independent.  Although socially and politically organized in vastly different ways than European 
states, they exercised jurisdictional control amounting to de facto sovereignty over their 
territories and peoples.  Their political independence was acknowledged by France and Britain in 
particular, in part through the negotiation of treaties with them.5  At the same time, however, in 
their relations with one another the European nations tended to act as though North America was 
juridically vacant – terra nullius – insofar as territorial sovereignty was concerned.6  They made 
preposterous claims to vast regions scarcely even explored by them on the basis of discovery, 
papal grants, symbolic acts of possession, royal charters, and the like that did not take account of 
the presence and control of the Indigenous nations.7  The Europeans thus adopted a two-faced 
approach to colonization, acknowledging Indigenous sovereignty on the one hand and effectively 
denying it on the other, depending on whether they were dealing with Indigenous nations or 
fellow European nations.8  Eventually, of course, the European nations and their successors, the 
United States, Mexico and Canada, were able to extend their de facto sovereignty over all of 
North America.  The European state system that became the basis for international law was 
applied, as it has been in the World generally (apart from oceans, seas, and Antarctica). 
 What, then, happened to the Indigenous sovereignty that pre-dated this state system?  Did 
it disappear, or was it somehow taken into account and incorporated into the body politic of what 
became the United States and Canada?  As these questions were addressed earlier and more 
explicitly in the United States, this paper begins with a discussion of how American 
jurisprudence modified the Westphalian model to make space for continuing Indigenous 
 
corporate power have also been weakening state sovereignty: e.g. see Joel Bakan, The New Corporation: How 
“Good” Corporations Are Bad for Democracy (Allen Lane, 2020). On other factors undermining state authority, see 
Creveld, supra note 1 at 336-414; James A. Caporaso, “Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public 
Authority, and Sovereignty” (2000) 2:2 Int’l Stud. Rev. 1. 
5 See W.J. Eccles, “Sovereignty-association, 1500-1783” (1984) 65:4 Can. Hist. Rev. 475; Cornelius J. Jaenen, 
“French Sovereignty and Native Nationhood during the French Régime”, in J.R. Miller, ed., Sweet Promises: A 
Reader on Indian-White Relations in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 19; Andrée Lajoie & 
Pierre Verville, “Les Traités d’Alliance entre les Français et Les Premières Nations sous le Régime Français”, in 
Andrée Lajoie, Jean-Maurice Brisson, Sylvio Normand & Alain Bissonnette, eds., Le Statut Juridique des Peuples 
Autochtones au Québec et le Pluralisme (Québec: Les Editions Yvon Blais, 1996), 161; Michael Asch, ed., 
Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equality, and Respect for Difference (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 1997) [Asch, Aboriginal and Treaty Rights]; Michael Asch, On Being Here to Stay: Treaties and Aboriginal 
Rights in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014) [Asch, On Being Here to Stay]. 
6 However, European practice varied, depending on the time and place. Acknowledgement of Indigenous 
sovereignty in North America was more common early in the colonization process than later on: see Brian Slattery, 
“Did France Claim Canada upon ‘Discovery’?”, in J.M. Bumsted, ed., Interpreting Canada’s Past, vol. 1, Before 
Confederation  (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986), 2-26; Michel Morin, L’Usurpation de la souveraineté 
autochtone: Le cas des peuples de la Nouvelle-France et des colonies anglaises de l’Amérique du Nord (Montréal: 
Boréal, 1997). 
7 See John Thomas Juricek, English Claims in North America to 1660: A Study in Legal and Constitutional History, 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago Department of History, 1970; Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in 
Europe′s Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Brian Slattery, 
“Paper Empires: The Legal Dimensions of French and English Ventures in North America” in John McLaren, A.R. 
Buck & Nancy E. Wright, eds., Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in British Settler Societies (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2005), 50-78. 
8 See Brian Slattery, “The Hidden Constitution: Aboriginal Rights in Canada” (1984) 32 Am. J. of Comp. L. 361, 
esp. at 361-63, 374-76. 
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sovereignty.  Turning to Canada, I suggest that an equivalent modification is beginning to take 
place here, so a sharing of Indigenous and Crown sovereignty can be envisaged.  International 
support for this development is provided by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples that Canada has pledged to implement. 
1. The United States 
The United States Supreme Court addressed the matter of the political status of the Indian 
nations or tribes (as they are still called in the US) in the 1820s and ’30s in three leading 
judgments delivered by Chief Justice John Marshall.  In Johnson v. M’Intosh,9 he dealt with the 
validity of pre-American Revolution private purchases of Indian land north of the Ohio River 
where the British Crown claimed sovereignty.  He found the purchases could not be upheld in 
American courts, mainly because the infamous doctrine of discovery, which he incorporated into 
American law from what he wrongly supposed to be a principle of international law,10 gave a 
discovering European nation the sole power of acquiring lands from the Indian nations by 
purchase or conquest.11  He also decided that the Royal Proclamation of 1763, issued by King 
George III, prevented purchases of Indian lands other than by the British Crown.  He nonetheless 
thought that Indigenous sovereignty and land rights were only limited by British acquisition of 
sovereignty – they were not extinguished: 
 In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were in no 
instance entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired.  
They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just 
claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their 
rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and 
their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was 
denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those 
who made it.12  
 But Marshall C.J. gave another reason for denying the enforceability of the private 
purchases in American courts that is even more revealing of the extent to which the Indian 
 
9 8 Wheat. (21 U.S.) 543 (1823). 
10 Marshall C.J. thought all the colonizing European powers had agreed to this principle, but this was not the case: 
see works cited in note 7 supra and L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (London: Longmans, Green, 
1905), vol. 1, 265; M.F. Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law 
(London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1926); Julius Goebel, Jr., The Struggle for the Falkland Islands: A Study in Legal 
and Diplomatic History (1927, reissued Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1971), 47-119; Friedrich August 
Freiherr von der Heydte, “Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and Virtual Effectiveness in International Law” (1935) 
29 Am. J. of Int’l L. 448. 
11 For critiques, see David E. Wilkins & K. Tsianina Lomawaima, Uneven Ground: American Indian Sovereignty 
and Federal Law (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001), 19-63; Frank Pommersheim, Broken Landscape: 
Indians, Indian Tribes, and the Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 88-115; Robert J. Miller, 
et al., Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English Colonies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010); Kent McNeil, “The Doctrine of Discovery Reconsidered: Reflecting on Robert J Miller, 
Jacinta Ruru, Larissa Behrendt, and Tracey Lindberg, Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in 
the English Colonies and Felix Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties: Aboriginal Nations and Canada” (2016) 53:2 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 699-728. 
12 Johnson v. M’Intosh, supra note 9 at 574 (emphasis added). 
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nations retained aspects of their sovereignty.  He said that purchases from those nations would be 
subject to their laws and, 
[a]dmitting their power to change their laws or usages, … if they choose to resume it 
[the grant], and make a different disposition of the land, the Courts of the United States 
cannot interpose for the protection of the title.  The person who purchases lands from the 
Indians, within their territory, incorporates himself with them, so far as respects the 
property purchased; holds their title under their protection, and subject to their laws.  If 
they annul the grant, we know of no tribunal which can revise and set aside the 
proceeding.13 
When the nations in question subsequently signed treaties ceding the territory where the lands 
were located to the United States, the earlier purchases were necessarily annulled.14  It is 
therefore apparent that Marshall C.J. thought the Indian nations retained not only their own laws, 
but also the sovereign authority to alter those laws after British colonization. 
 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,15 the second of the Marshall trilogy of Indian rights cases, 
was brought by the Cherokee Nation in the Supreme Court, which has original jurisdiction to 
decide cases in which a State is a party, including cases between “a State … and foreign 
States”.16  The Cherokee Nation sought “an injunction to restrain the state of Georgia from the 
execution of certain laws of that state, which, as is alleged, go directly to annihilate the 
Cherokees as a political society, and to seize, for the use of Georgia, the lands of the nation 
which have been assured to them by the United States in solemn treaties repeatedly made and 
still in force.”17  For the Supreme Court to have jurisdiction, the Cherokee Nation therefore had 
to be a “foreign State”.  Marshall C.J. had no difficulty finding the Cherokee Nation to be a state: 
So much of the argument as was intended to prove the character of the Cherokees as a 
state, as a distinct political society, separated from others, capable of managing its own 
affairs and governing itself, has, in the opinion of a majority of the judges, been 
completely successful.  They have been uniformly treated as a state from the settlement 
of our country.  The numerous treaties made with them by the United States recognize 
them as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, [and] of being 
responsible in their political character for any violation of their engagements….  The acts 
of our government plainly recognize the Cherokee Nation as a state, and the courts are 
bound by those acts.18 
 A more difficult question was whether the Cherokee Nation is a foreign State.  Noting the 
unique position of the Cherokees, Marshall C.J. observed that “[t]he condition of the Indians in 
relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two peoples in existence.”19  
 
13 Ibid. at 593 (emphasis added). 
14 Ibid. at 593-94. 
15 5 Pet. (30 U.S.) 1 (1831) [Cherokee Nation]. 
16 Constitution of the United States, Art. III, s.2(1)-(2). 
17 Cherokee Nation, supra note 15 at 15. 




While acknowledging that the Cherokees are aliens who do not owe allegiance to the United 
States,20 he said that the “Indian territory is admitted to compose part of the United States.”21  He 
continued: 
In all our intercourse with foreign nations, in our commercial regulations, in any attempt 
at intercourse between Indians and foreign nations, they are considered as within the 
jurisdictional limits of the United States, subject to many of those restraints which are 
imposed upon our own citizens.  They acknowledge themselves in their treaties to be 
under the protection of the United States; they admit that the United States shall have the 
sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with them, and managing all their affairs 
as they think proper.22 
 From this, we can see that, in the Supreme Court’s opinion, the Cherokee and other 
Indian nations were regarded as residing within the territorial limits of the United States.  Their 
external sovereignty had been lost because they could no longer trade or enter into other relations 
with foreign nations, as those matters were governed by the United States.  Marshal C.J. 
confirmed this loss of external sovereignty by stating that “[t]hey and their country are 
considered by foreign nations, as well as by ourselves, as being so completely under the 
sovereignty and dominion of the United States that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form 
a political connexion with them, would be considered by all as an invasion of our territory and an 
act of hostility.”23  Consequently, the Indian nations, although states in the sense that they have 
retained political authority, are not foreign states, but rather “domestic dependent nations.”24  
Marshall C.J. found further support for this conclusion in article I, section 8(3), of the 
Constitution, which provides Congress with the power to “regulate commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.”  By designating the Indian 
tribes separately from foreign nations in this clause, the Constitutional Convention cannot, in his 
opinion, have meant to include them in the meaning of “foreign States” in article III, section 
2(1), when describing the jurisdiction of the courts.25  As a result, the motion for an injunction 
was denied because the Court lacked jurisdiction under the Constitution to decide the case. 
 The third Indian rights case decided by the Marshall Court, Worcester v. Georgia,26 also 
involved the Cherokee Nation.  It resulted from the prosecution and conviction by the State of 
Georgia of an American missionary, Samuel Worcester of Vermont, for violating Georgia law by 
residing in Cherokee territory without a licence from the State.  He appealed his conviction and 
sentence of four years of hard labour in a State penitentiary to the Supreme Court, which clearly 
had jurisdiction over this case.  Worcester argued, among other things, that the law of Georgia 
 
20 Indians generally were only made US citizens in 1924 by an Act of Congress: A bill granting citizenship to 
Indians, and for other purposes, Act of June 2, 1924, 43 Stat. 253. Thereafter, those who are enrolled members of 
Indian nations have dual citizenship. See Nell Jessup Newton et al., eds., Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law 
2012 Edition (Newark NJ: LexisNexis, 2012), §14.01. 
21 Cherokee Nation, supra note 15 at 17. 
22 Ibid. at 17. 
23 Ibid. at 17-18. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. at 18-20. 
26 6 Pet. (31 U.S.) 513 (1832). 
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under which he had been charged was unconstitutional because it was repugnant to treaties 
between the United States and the Cherokee Nation, by which the United States had 
acknowledged that the Cherokee are a sovereign nation with authority to govern themselves and 
everyone residing in their territory, free of any interference by State legislatures.  The Supreme 
Court agreed and overturned the conviction. 
In several key passages, Marshall C.J. provided further understanding of the status of the 
Indian nations and their relationship with the United States.  He started with the factual 
observation that “America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct 
people, divided into separate nations, independent of each other and of the rest of the world, 
having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their own laws.”27  He affirmed 
the doctrine of discovery he had adopted in Johnson v. M’Intosh, but modified it by limiting it to 
regulation of the rights among the European nations who had agreed to it – it could not affect the 
rights of the Indian nations who were in already in possession and who had not agreed to it.28  
Referring to the pre-American Revolution colonial period, he said: 
Certain it is, that our history furnishes no example, from the first settlement of our 
country, of any attempt on the part of the crown to interfere with the internal affairs of the 
Indians, farther than to keep out the agents of foreign powers, who, as traders or 
otherwise, might seduce them into foreign alliances.  The King … purchased their 
alliance and dependence by subsidies; but never intruded into the interior of their affairs, 
or interfered with their self government, so far as respected themselves only.29 
Thus, while Britain asserted its sovereignty over the Indian nations insofar as their external 
relations were concerned, it respected their internal sovereignty.  Likewise, when the “United 
States succeeded to all the claims of Great Britain, both territorial and political”, it made no 
attempt “to enlarge them.”30  The American government continued to respect both the internal 
sovereignty and the land rights of the Indian nations: 
From the commencement of our government, congress has passed acts to regulate trade 
and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and 
manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate.  All these acts 
… manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political communities, 
having territorial boundaries within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right 
to all the lands within those, which is not only acknowledged, but guarantied, by the 
United States.31 
In a passage summing up the status of the Indian nations, Marshall C.J. concluded: 
 
27 Ibid. at 542-43. 
28 Ibid. at 544. In the international law upon which Marshall C.J. relied, agreements are binding only on the parties: 
see Clipperton Island Case (1932), 26 A.J.I.L. 390 at 394; Lord [Arnold Duncan] McNair, The Law of Treaties 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 309-21; Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 7thth ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 672-74.  
29 Worcester v. Georgia, supra 26 at 547. 
30 Ibid. at 544. 
31 Ibid. at 556-57. 
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The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political 
communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the 
soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible 
power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate than the 
first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed: and this was a restriction 
which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the Indians.  The 
very term “nation,” so generally applied to them, means “a people distinct from others.” 
…  The words “treaty” and “nation” are words of our own language, selected in our 
diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well 
understood meaning.  We have applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to the 
other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same sense.32 
Consequently, the laws of Georgia could not apply in Cherokee territory, as that would violate 
the treaty relationship between the Cherokee and the United States and impinge on the political 
authority of the Cherokee nation.  Under the Constitution and laws of the United States, relations 
with the Cherokee are entirely under the jurisdiction of the federal government.33 
 The internal sovereignty of the Indian nations has been reaffirmed by the US Supreme 
Court on numerous occasions.34  As we have seen from Marshall C.J.’s judgments, American 
acknowledgement of this internal sovereignty was simply a continuation of the earlier policy of 
the British Crown.  So during the very period when the Westphalian conception of absolute 
sovereignty came to dominate European political thought and international law, a different 
concept of shared sovereignty was being applied in North America.  This concept continued 
under the federal system created by the US Constitution, which may have drawn inspiration from 
the Constitution of the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) Confederacy.35  So in the United States, 
sovereignty is shared internally by the federal government, the Indian nations, and the States.  
However, the Supreme Court has subjected the internal sovereignty of the Indian nations to a 
severe limitation – it is subject to the plenary power of Congress and so can be restricted and 
even terminated at any time.36  As we shall see, the Canadian Parliament had the same power up 
 
32 Ibid. at 559-60. 
33 Ibid. at 561. 
34 E.g., see Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 at 560-62 (1883); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 at 557 
(1975); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 at 322-24 
(1978); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 at 204-05 (2004) [Lara]. 
35 Whether the Haudenosaunee example influenced the Founding Fathers is a matter of debate: e.g., compare Donald 
A. Grinde Jr. & Bruce E. Johansen Exemplar of Liberty: Native America and the Evolution of Democracy (Los 
Angeles: American Indian Studies Center, University of California, 1991), with Philip A. Levy, “Exemplars of 
Taking Liberties: The Iroquois Influence Thesis and the Problem of Evidence” (1996) 53:3 William & Mary Q. 588, 
and Samuel B. Payne Jr., “The Iroquois League, the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution”, ibid., 605. See 
Grinde & Johansen’s response, “Sauce for the Goose: Demand and Definitions for ‘Proof’ Regarding the Iroquois 
and Democracy”, ibid., 621. 
36 E.g., see United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); Tee-Hit-
Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955); Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 at 
192 (1989); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 at 343 (1998). For confirmation of the plenary 
power doctrine in the 21st century, see Lara, supra note 34. For criticism, see Philip P. Frickey, “Domesticating 
Federal Indian Law” (1996) 81 Minn. L. Rev. 31; Robert N. Clinton, “There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for 
Indian Tribes” (2002) 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 113; Robert A. Williams, Jr., Like a Loaded Weapon: The Rehnquist Court, 
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until 1982, when it was removed by recognition of Aboriginal and treaty rights in the 
Constitution. 
2. Canada 
Although Canada, like the United States, is a federal state, the concept of shared sovereignty 
somehow got lost in the transition from British colonies to independent nation-state.  Perhaps 
this was due to the concept of a unified Crown in which complete sovereignty is thought to be 
vested – the federal and provincial governments act on its behalf but, in theory, the Crown is a 
single legal entity that F.W. Maitland described as “a corporation sole.”37  Despite the unreality 
of this concept in a nation where the federal and provincial governments enter into contracts and 
sue one another in court, it has remained remarkably tenacious.38 
Nonetheless, the notion of a single sovereign in Canada from which all governmental 
authority is derived is inconsistent with our history.  From the outset of colonization, the French 
and British entered into treaties with the Indigenous peoples that acknowledged their political 
authority, a process that continued up to the 1920s, was renewed in the 1970s, and continues to 
this day.39  Although France and Britain claimed sovereignty vis-à-vis other European nations 
over the territory now known as Canada, they realized that their relations with the Indigenous 
nations were a separate matter, governed in part by Indigenous laws and protocols.40  In 1664, 
the British entered into the Two-Row-Wampum (Kaswehntha or Guswhenta) Treaty with the 
Haudenosaunee at Albany, by which they agreed to respect each other’s independence.41 In 
1701, France negotiated a treaty of peace and alliance with forty sovereign Indigenous nations, 
an event that historian Gilles Havard describes as “a triumph for Amerindian diplomatic 
customs.”42 In 1764, after the British Crown acquired New France and issued the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763, Sir William Johnson, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the 
Britain’s northern district, met with numerous Indigenous nations at Niagara, where he read the 
Proclamation and negotiated a treaty that respected their protocols and, among other things, 
 
Indian Rights, and the Legal History of Racism in America (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 71-
83. On termination, see Donald L. Fixico, Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy, 1945-1960 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986). 
37 F.W. Maitland, “The Crown as Corporation Sole” (1901) 17 L.Q.R. 131. 
38 For recent affirmation of the unity of the Crown, see Grassy Narrows First Nation v. Ontario (Natural 
Resources), [2014] 2 S.C.R. 447. For criticism, see Kent McNeil, “The Obsolete Theory of Crown Unity in Canada 
and Its Relevance to Indigenous Claims” (2015) 20 Rev. of Const’l Stud. 1. 
39 See James (Sa’ke’j) Youngblood Henderson, Treaty Rights in the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: Thomson 
Carswell, 2007); Joshua Ben David Nichols, “A Narrowing Field of View: An Investigation into the Relationship 
Between the Principles of Treaty Interpretation and the Conceptual Framework of Canadian Federalism” (2019) 
56:2 Osgoode Hall L.J. 350-95. Canada inaugurated the modern treaty process in 1973 by creating the 
comprehensive land claims policy after the Supreme Court’s decision in Calder v. Attorney-General of British 
Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313. 
40 In addition to the sources cited supra in notes 6 and 7, see Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples, vol. 1, Looking Forward, Looking Back (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1996), 99-136; Aimée 
Craft, Breathing Life into the Stone Fort Treaty: An Anishinabe Understanding of Treaty One (Saskatoon: Purich 
Publishing, 2013), especially 31-36, 66-83.  
41 See Henderson, supra note 39 at 158-61. 
42 Gilles Havard, The Great Peace of Montreal of 1701: French-Native Diplomacy in the Seventeenth Century, 
translated by Phyllis Aronoff & Howard Scott (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), 182. 
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“gave treaty recognition to the nation-to-nation relationship between the First Nations and the 
British Crown.”43 
  In 1990 in R. v. Sioui,44 the Supreme Court of Canada likewise acknowledged the 
independence of the Indigenous nations in what is now Eastern Canada during the colonial 
period when France and Britain claimed sovereignty vis-à-vis Europeans.  For a unanimous 
Court, Justice Lamer (as he then was) said: 
The mother countries did everything in their power to secure the alliance of each Indian 
nation and to encourage nations allied with the enemy to change sides.  When these 
efforts met with success, they were incorporated in treaties of alliance or neutrality.  This 
clearly indicates that the Indian nations were regarded in their relations with the 
European nations which occupied North America as independent nations.  The papers of 
Sir William Johnson (The Papers of Sir William Johnson, 14 vol.), who was in charge of 
Indian affairs in British North America, demonstrate the recognition by Great Britain that 
nation-to-nation relations had to be conducted with the North American Indians.45 
Lamer J. then quoted with approval a passage from in Worcester v. Georgia where the Chief 
Justice Marshall had said: “Such was the policy of Great Britain towards the Indian nations 
inhabiting the territory from which she excluded all other Europeans; such her claims, and such 
her practical exposition of the charters she had granted: she considered them as nations capable 
of maintaining the relations of peace and war; of governing themselves, under her protection; 
and she made treaties with them, the obligation of which she acknowledged.”46  So although 
Britain excluded other European nations from the territories it claimed, it still considered the 
Indigenous peoples inhabiting these territories as nations that governed themselves.  Moreover, 
when Britain accepted the French Capitulation of Montreal in 1760, that “was fundamentally an 
agreement between the French and the British which in no way prevented independent 
agreements between the British and the Indian nations, whether allies of the French or of the 
British, being concluded or continuing to exist.”47  In other words, treaties with France only 
governed relations with that nation.  “It would be contrary to the general principles of law,” 
Lamer J. said, “for an agreement concluded between the English and the French to extinguish a 
treaty concluded between the English and the Hurons.”48 Treaties with the Indigenous nations 
thus operated in a separate realm – they created nation-to-nation relationships that were not 
affected by diplomatic dealings between European nations. 
 Remarkably, one week after deciding R. v. Sioui, the Supreme Court delivered its 
unanimous judgment in R. v. Sparrow, in which it declared that “there was from the outset never 
 
43 Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney General), 51 O.R. (3d) 641 at para. 56. See John Borrows, 
“Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal History, and Self-Government”, in Asch, 
Aboriginal and Treaty Rights, supra note 6 at 155.  
44 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025. 
45 Ibid. at 1053. 
46 Ibid. at 1054, quoting Worcester v. Georgia, supra note 26 at 548-49 (Lamer J.’s emphasis). 




any doubt that sovereignty and legislative power … vested in the Crown”.49  The Sparrow case 
involved the fishing rights of the Musqueam in British Columbia, where relations between the 
Indigenous peoples and the British were different from Eastern Canada.  British sovereignty was 
asserted much later in British Columbia and treaties were not negotiated there, apart from the 
fourteen Douglas Treaties in the 1850s, involving small areas of Vancouver Island, and Treaty 8 
in 1899, extending into the northeast of the province.  Another difference was that the 
Indigenous peoples in what is now British Columbia were each smaller in population and more 
isolated geographically from one another than the Mi’kmaq, Haudenosaunee, Huron, 
Anishinaabe, and other eastern Indigenous peoples, so they did not pose a military threat to the 
British, either on their own or as allies of France, Britain’s colonial rival in the East.  The British 
apparently thought they could simply assert sovereignty over the Indigenous peoples west of the 
Rocky Mountains, and only entered into treaties with a few of them on Vancouver Island to 
acquire lands for settlement. The Supreme Court apparently agreed, given the statement in 
Sparrow that the Crown acquired sovereignty “at the outset” (which we now know was in 1846 
when a bilateral treaty with the United States “conclusively established” British sovereignty50), 
even over the territories of the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en, far to the north of the international 
boundary along 49th parallel in a region where the British were certainly not in effective 
occupation or control at the time. 
 How could Britain have acquired sovereignty over all of British Columbia in 1846 when 
its occupation and control was limited to small areas around isolated trading posts (e.g. Fort 
Langley and Fort Victoria) operated by the Hudson’s Bay Company, posts that were few and far 
between and located mainly in the southern part of the territory?51  Britain obviously did not 
have de facto sovereignty over the rest of the province, as that would have required effective 
control and the exercise of government functions.  Its assertion of sovereignty was at best 
notional – it operated only at some abstract level and would not even have provided Britain with 
de jure sovereignty in the international law of the time.52 
 More recently, the Supreme Court has begun to exhibit some discomfort with the notion 
that the Crown could acquire sovereignty by mere assertion, confirmed by a treaty with the 
United States.  In two decisions released simultaneously in 2004, Haida Nation v. British 
 
49 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at 1103 [Sparrow]. 
50 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 at para. 145 [Delgamuukw], relying on the 1846 Oregon 
Boundary Treaty that created the international boundary between British and American territories in the Pacific 
Northwest. 
51 See Derek Hayes, Historical Atlas of British Columbia and the Pacific Northwest (Vancouver, BC: Cavendish 
Books, 1999), 112-13, 125-27. 
52 See Island of Palmas Case, (1928) 2 R.I.A.A. 829; Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case (1933), 2 P.C.I.J., 
Series A/B, No 43; Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, 1953 I.C.J.R. 47; Travers Twiss, The Law of Nations Considered 
as Independent Political Communities (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1884), 196-211; L. Oppenheim, International 
Law: A Treatise (London: Longmans, Green, 1905), vol. 1, 275-80; M.F. Lindley, The Acquisition and Government 
of Backward Territory in International Law (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1926), 139-51. On the distinction 
between de facto and de jure sovereignty, see Kent McNeil, “Indigenous and Crown Sovereignty in Canada”, in 
Michael Asch, John Borrows & James Tully, eds., Resurgence and Reconciliation: Indigenous-Settler Relations and 
Earth Teachings (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018), 293 at 301-02. 
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Columbia (Minister of Forests)53 and Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia 
(Project Assessment Director),54 the Court, for the first time, acknowledged “pre-existing 
Aboriginal sovereignty”, referred to Crown sovereignty as “de facto”, and said that the promise 
of rights recognition in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 “is realized and sovereignty 
claims reconciled through the process of honourable negotiation.”55  But if the Indigenous 
nations of British Columbia were sovereign prior to Britain’s assertion of sovereignty in 1846,56 
how could the Crown have acquired sovereignty over them and their territories without conquest 
and without treaties with them that recognized Crown sovereignty?57  A possible international 
law answer is prescription, which involves the peaceful exercise of de facto sovereignty for a 
sufficiently long time, but apparently de jure sovereignty could only be acquired by prescription 
if the prior sovereigns acquiesced, which the Indigenous nations have not.  Moreover, 
prescription could not have applied in 1846 because the Crown’s exercise of sovereignty did not 
even commence over most of the province until many years later.58 
 It is thus apparent that the Supreme Court has created quite a muddle for itself by 
acknowledging pre-existing Indigenous sovereignty while continuing to accept 1846 as the time 
of Crown assertion of sovereignty in British Columbia.59  A more accurate understanding of the 
legal history would be to accept that the Oregon Boundary Treaty of 1846 only settled the 
territorial claims of Britain and the United States in relation to one another.  Given that the 
Indigenous nations were sovereign, that bilateral treaty could not have affected their territorial 
rights because they were not parties to it.60  Crown sovereignty over British Columbia was not 
acquired by that treaty; instead, the Crown gradually extended its sovereignty by exercising de 
facto jurisdiction and control over the province.  The Supreme Court acknowledged in Haida 
Nation and Taku River that the Crown’s sovereignty is de facto.  However, due to the act of state 
 
53 [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 [Haida Nation]. 
54 [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550 [Taku River]. 
55 Haida Nation, supra note 55 at para 20; Taku River, supra note 54 at para 42. Section 35(1) of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Sch. B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.) 1982. c. 11, provides: “The existing aboriginal and treaty 
rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.” The pre-existing sovereignty of the 
Indigenous nations was reaffirmed in Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] 1 
S.C.R. 623 at para. 67, and Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Governor General in Council), [2018] 2 S.C.R. 
765 at para. 21. 
56 This date for Crown assertion of sovereignty was confirmed, after Haida Nation and Taku River, supra notes 53 
and 54, in Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 257 at para. 60 [Tsilhqot’in Nation]. 
57 The Supreme Court acknowledged in Haida Nation, supra note 53 at para. 25, that the Indigenous peoples had 
never been conquered. 
58 On prescription, see D.H.N. Johnson, “Acquisitive Prescription in International Law” (1950) 27 Brit. Yb of Int’l L.  
332; R.Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1963), 20-28; Yehuda Z. Blum, Historic Titles in International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997), 6-37; 
Shaw, supra note 28 at 364-66; Asch, On Being Here to Stay, supra note 6 at 38-41. 
59 Although the Court usually refers to “assertion” of sovereignty, assertion must result in acquisition of sovereignty 
by the Crown: see Delgamuukw, supra note 49 at para. 145, where acquisition of underlying title to land was said to 
accompany assertion of sovereignty, which was “conclusively established by the Oregon Boundary Treaty of 1846.” 
60 See the authorities cited in note 28 supra and the quotations from R. v. Sioui accompanying notes 47 and 48 
supra. This is consistent as well with Marshall C.J.’s opinion in Worcester v. Georgia that the international law 
doctrine of discovery could not affect the rights of the Indian nations because they were not party to the agreement 
that created it: see text accompanying note 28 supra. 
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doctrine, the courts do not have the authority to question Crown sovereignty.61  They are obliged 
to accept its reality but lack jurisdiction to rule on its legality.  Nonetheless, as we have seen, the 
Court in Haida Nation seems to have realized that Crown sovereignty would not be legitimate 
until it is reconciled with pre-existing Indigenous sovereignty through honourable negotiations 
leading to treaties.62 
 What, then, is the situation prior to the negotiation of treaties that reconcile sovereignties, 
which is still the situation in most of British Columbia?  It cannot be that the Westphalian model 
of sovereignty applies to give the Crown complete sovereignty, as that would be inconsistent 
with historical reality and fundamental principles of justice and self-determination of peoples.63  
In 1846, we have seen that Britain occupied only tiny bits of the province (Hudson’s Bay 
Company posts) and exercised no jurisdiction whatsoever over the Indigenous peoples.  
Consequently, Indigenous law and governmental authority must have continued unabated – there 
was simply no other law and authority in place.  In other words, Indigenous sovereignty was 
maintained, alongside Crown sovereignty that was limited to miniscule areas.  Over the second 
half of the 19th century, the Crown gradually extended its jurisdiction over most of province, 
acquiring de facto sovereignty, as the Supreme Court recognized in Haida Nation and Taku 
River.  But this does not mean Indigenous sovereignty was entirely displaced.64  Despite 
infringements on their sovereignty by the application of provincial and federal laws, such as 
hunting and fishing laws and the Indian Act,65 Indigenous nations continued to govern 
themselves and follow their own laws, albeit clandestinely in many cases.66  In Campbell v. 
 
61 See Duff Development Co. v. Government of Kelantan, [1924] A.C. 797 (H.L); R. v. Kent Justices, [1967] 1 All 
E.R. 560 (Q.B.) at 564-65; Adams v. Adams, [1970] 3 All E.R. 572 (P.D.A.) at 583, 585; Mabo v. Queensland 
(1992), 175 C.L.R. 1 at 31-32, 78–79; W. Harrison Moore, Act of State in English Law (London: John Murray, 
1906); Kenneth Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1966), 116. 
62 See Felix Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties: Aboriginal Nations and Canada (Saskatoon: University of 
Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2012); Brian Slattery, “Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown” (2005) 
29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 433 at 437-38. 
63 See Nichols, supra note 39. On the application of fundamental principles of justice in this context, see Brian 
Slattery, “Aboriginal Sovereignty and Imperial Claims” (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall L.J. 681 at 696-700, arguing that 
“every human society whose members draw the essentials of life from territories in their possession (whether 
collectively or individually) has a right to these territories as against other societies and individuals” (at 697). The 
right of Indigenous peoples to self-determination is recognized by article 3 of the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, discussed below. 
64 See Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Partners in Confederation: Aboriginal Peoples, Self-Government, 
and the Constitution (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1993). 
65 First enacted in 1876, S.C. 1876, c. 18. 
66 E.g., after the potlatch was banned in 1884, this governance practice continued clandestinely in many 
communities: see Arthur J. Ray, I Have Lived Here Since the World Began: An Illustrated History of Canada’s 
Native Peoples (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1996), 222-30. Regarding fishing, the Supreme Court held in Sparrow, 
supra note 49 at 1095-98, that even intensive federal regulation did not extinguish inherent Aboriginal rights to fish. 
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British Columbia,67 Justice Williamson decided that the Indigenous peoples’ inherent right to 
govern themselves has continued and not been extinguished.68 
 So as both a practical and a legal matter, the Indigenous nations must have retained some 
of their sovereignty.  As a result of Crown acquisition of sovereignty, they have no doubt lost 
their authority to engage in relations with foreign states – given that the international community 
acknowledges Crown sovereignty over Canada, Indigenous sovereignty is internal rather than 
external.  How, then, is sovereignty shared internally?  Federal and provincial powers are listed 
in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.69  But as decided by Williamson J. in 
Campbell, that Act did not exhaustively distribute governmental powers.70  The pre-existing 
governmental authority of the Indigenous peoples continued and was recognized and affirmed by 
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.71  Unlike sections 91 and 92, that section does not 
enumerate the powers of Indigenous governments; instead, it provides constitutional space and 
protection for the inherent governmental authority that Indigenous nations have as a result of 
their pre-colonization sovereignty.  As Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged in Johnson v. 
M’Intosh and Worcester v. Georgia, prior to European colonization that authority was complete 
because the Indigenous nations were sovereign.  European assertions of sovereignty and the 
incorporation of the Indigenous peoples into the United States diminished their sovereignty so 
they could no longer interact with foreign states, but it did not take away their internal 
sovereignty.  Likewise in Canada, the inherent right of the Indigenous peoples to govern 
themselves, while limited by the concept of sovereign incompatibility,72 has continued to this 
day. 
 However, because the Crown has sovereignty, Parliament and the provincial legislatures 
also have governmental authority over Indigenous territories.  Their authority, as defined by 
sections 91 and 92, is concurrent with Indigenous governmental authority, so federal and 
provincial laws can apply in Indigenous territories, in the absence of conflict with Indigenous 
laws.  In the event of conflict, Indigenous laws should prevail because Indigenous sovereignty is 
protected by section 35.  For federal or provincial laws to prevail over Indigenous laws, the 
Crown would have to prove that, in the circumstances, this is a justifiable infringement in 
accordance with the test established by the Supreme Court in Sparrow, which requires proof of a 
 
67 [2000] 4 C.N.L.R. 1 (B.C.S.C.) [Campbell]. In House of Sga’nisim v. Canada (Attorney General), [2012] 2 
C.N.L.R. 82 (B.C.S.C.), Smith J. followed this aspect of Campbell out of comity, but also held that governance 
provisions of the Nisga’a Final Agreement (ratified 2000), the validity of which was challenged in both these cases, 
could also be upheld as delegated authority. Smith’s decision was upheld on appeal on the latter basis, without 
deciding the inherent right issue: [2013] 2 C.N.L.R. 226 (B.C.C.A.). 
68 See also Pastion v. Dene Tha’ First Nation, [2018] 4 FCR 467 at paras. 8-14 [Pastion]; Dickson v. Vuntut 
Gwitchin First Nation, 2020 YKSC 22. 
69 30 & 31 Vict, (U.K.), c.3. 
70 Campbell, supra note 67 at paras. 65-82. See also Joshua Ben David Nichols, A Reconciliation without Reflection: 
An Investigation into the Foundations of Aboriginal Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020). 
71 Campbell, supra note 67 at paras. 85-143. Section 35(1) is quoted in note 55 supra. 
72 See Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, per McLachlin C.J. at para. 10, Binnie J. at paras. 66-174. Justice 
Binnie, writing a minority judgment for himself and Major J., acknowledged that sovereignty in Canada could be 
shared between the Crown and Indigenous peoples, but viewed control over borders as so essential to Canada that 
any Indigenous rights inconsistent with that control would be incompatible with Crown sovereignty. 
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valid legislative objective and respect for the Crown’s fiduciary obligations towards the 
Indigenous peoples.73 
 Section 35 has resulted in a major shift in Canadian constitutional law.  Prior to its 
enactment, Parliament enjoyed complete legislative authority over Indigenous peoples and their 
rights,74 equivalent to the plenary power of Congress in the United States.  Since 1982, the rights 
recognized and affirmed by that section can no longer be extinguished unilaterally, even by 
Parliament,75 and infringement requires justification, which the Crown, as far as I know, has only 
been able to succeed in proving in one instance.76  The shared sovereignty that pre-dated section 
35 has thus been constitutionalized, providing the Indigenous peoples with substantial protection 
for their governmental authority.77 
3. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
The UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (Declaration) on September 13, 2007.78  Although the United States and Canada initially 
voted against the Declaration, in 2010 President Obama announced that the United States would 
support it, and Canada in the same year provided weak acceptance.  The Trudeau government 
went further in 2016 by endorsing it without qualification and promising to implement it. 
Several articles in the Declaration are relevant to our discussion because they appear to 
endorse the concept of shared sovereignty.  Article 3 states that “Indigenous peoples have the 
right to self-determination.  By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”  The right to “freely determine 
their political status” must mean that they have the right to govern themselves.  This is explicitly 
confirmed in article 4: “Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have 
the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as 
well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.”  Article 5 provides in part 
that “Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, 
economic, social and cultural institutions” (this is repeated in article 20, with slightly different 
wording, with “develop” in place of “strengthen”).  This implies that, if the authority of their 
political institutions has been restricted, their right to self-determination includes the right to re-
 
73 For further discussion, see Kent McNeil, “The Jurisdiction of Inherent Right Aboriginal Governments” (West 
Vancouver: National Centre for First Nations Governance, 2007), online: Osgoode Digital Commons and 
<http://fngovernance.org/ncfng_research/kent_mcneil.pdf>. 
74 See R. v. Sikyea, [1964] S.C.R. 642; R. v. George, [1966] S.C.R. 267; Kruger v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 104 
at 111-12; R. v. Derriksan (1976), 71 D.L.R. (3d) 159. 
75 R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at para. 28; Mitchell v. MNR, supra note 71 at para. 11. 
76 R. v. Constant; R. v. Goulet, [2003] 2 C.N.L.R. 240 (Que. C.A.), leave to appeal dismissed, S.C.C., 28 August 
2003, involving prohibition of use of live bait for fishing. 
77 The Parliament of Canada, in An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 
2019, c. 24, in force as of 1 January 2020, acknowledged the constitutional authority of the Indigenous peoples to 
govern themselves. Section 18(1) provides: “The inherent right of self-government recognized and affirmed by 
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 includes jurisdiction in relation to child and family services, including 
legislative authority in relation to those services and authority to administer and enforce laws made under that 
legislative authority.” 
78 Online: <https://undocs.org/A/RES/61/295>. 
15 
 
assert their governance authority.  Article 18 states: “Indigenous peoples have the right to 
participate in decision-making in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives 
chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and 
develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions.”  These representative institutions 
are obviously governmental in nature, as they have authority to participate in decision-making in 
relation to rights.  Article 33(2) provides that “Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the 
structures and to select the membership of their institutions in accordance with their own 
procedures.”  “Institutions” in this article must include “political institutions” in accordance with 
articles 5 and 20 (above).  Article 34 acknowledges the right of Indigenous peoples “to promote, 
develop and maintain their … judicial systems and customs”, thereby recognizing that they have 
governance authority in relation to enforcing their own laws.79  Article 37(1) provides that 
“Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties, 
agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with States or their successors and to 
have States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements.”  
As we have seen, early treaties in what are now the United States and Canada acknowledged 
Indigenous sovereignty and created nation-to-nation relationships.  Articles 41 and 42 impose 
obligations on the United Nations to contribute to the realization of the Declaration’s provisions 
and to promote respect for the rights contained therein. 
Taken as a whole, the Declaration’s provisions provide strong acknowledgment of the 
right of Indigenous peoples to govern themselves, but only within the confines of the state that 
encompasses them.  This is made clear at the end of the Declaration in article 46, which provides 
in part: “Nothing in this Declaration may be … construed as authorizing or encouraging any 
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political 
unity of sovereign and independent States.” 
 The Declaration is consistent with the American concept of shared sovereignty (though 
probably not with the plenary power of Congress) that has been accepted by the Supreme Court 
ever since Chief Justice Marshall’s decisions in the 1820s and ’30s.  Justifiable infringement 
aside,80 it is also consistent with the interpretation of Canadian constitutional law presented in 
this paper.  The Declaration thus provides international confirmation of the continuing internal 
sovereignty of the Indigenous peoples in North America. 
4. Conclusion 
 
79 In Pastion, supra note 68 at para. 10, Grammond J. cited Article 34 in support of Indigenous peoples’ authority to 
make their own laws. 
80 Article 46(2) of the Declaration provides in part: “The exercise of the rights set forth in this Declaration shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law and in accordance with international human rights 
obligations. Any such limitations shall be non-discriminatory and strictly necessary solely for the purpose of 
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for meeting the just and most 
compelling requirements of a democratic society.” On whether this provision allows for justification of infringement 
of Declaration rights in much the same way as the Supreme Court has allowed for justifiable infringement of section 
35 rights, see Ryan Beaton, “Articles 27 and 46(2): UNDRIP Signposts Pointing beyond the Justifiable Infringement 
Morass of Section 35”, in UNDRIP Implementation: More reflections on the Braiding of International, Domestic 
and Indigenous Laws, Special Report (Waterloo, ON: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2018), 111. 
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The concept of absolute state sovereignty is gradually being eroded as Indigenous nations in 
North America challenge its imposition on them and demand acknowledgement of their 
sovereignty.  However, with rare exceptions – the Haudenosaunee Confederacy is one – they are 
not asserting their independence from the United States or Canada.  Instead, they are generally 
willing to share sovereignty with the governments of these states.   
  Although the United States Supreme Court acknowledged internal Indigenous 
sovereignty early on, the Court’s later invention of congressional plenary power over the Indian 
nations has diminished Indigenous sovereignty by making it vulnerable to the legislative will of 
Congress.  Fortunately, Canada moved away from parliamentary supremacy over the Indigenous 
peoples when section 35 was included in the Constitution in 1982, though the justifiable 
infringement doctrine does provide a way for legislatures to impinge on Indigenous sovereignty 
in some situations.  Nonetheless, shared sovereignty is now a constitutional reality in Canada.   
 The Westphalian model of complete state sovereignty has never applied in North 
America, as is evident from the nation-to-nation relationships developed with the Indigenous 
peoples by treaty and other dealings.81  The United Nations, by adopting the Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, has acknowledged that internal sovereignty has to be shared with 
Indigenous peoples.  The challenge now is to get states to take this concept of shared sovereignty 
seriously and fully implement the Declaration.  
 
81 See Joshua Ben David Nichols, “A Narrowing Field of View: An Investigation into the Relationship Between the 
Principles of Treaty Interpretation and the Conceptual Framework of Canadian Federalism” (2019) 56:2 Osgoode 
Hall L.J. 350-95. 
 
